More recently the US administration
has accused Dr Khan of selling his expertise to the North Koreans
who are busy trying to restart their own nuclear program. It is
believed that Dr Khan visited North Korea as many as thirteen times
in recent years. Moreover the US claims to have intelligence of
an unannounced Pakistani military delegation to North Korea, perhaps
attached to the exchange of missile and nuclear technology between
the two countries. The theory goes that the expertise of Dr Khan
in matters nuclear was traded for the missile expertise of the North
Koreans. In fact, the Ghauri I missile of Pakistan is a modified
version of the North Korean Nodong missile of which Dr Khan was
able to secure between ten and twelve samples in 1992 (Dr Khan also
led Pakistan's medium range missile program). Involvement in the
North Korean program led the US to slap sanctions on the Khan Research
Laboratories in May. This has followed massive US pressure in past
years on General Musharaf to remove Dr Khan from his official capacity
at the head of the Pakistani nuclear program, a demand conceded
by the General two years ago. This move simply served to make Khan
an independent player, no longer under strict government direction.
In fact, the recent complaints of the US show that some of the North
Korean program was aided by Khan in a freelance capacity.
It has sometimes been claimed in
Dr Khan's defence that his expertise lay in the area of uranium
enrichment rather than the reprocessing that the North Koreans have
restarted. Although this is a very weak defence it brings us to
the current case of Iran. In 1995, led by Boris Yeltsin, the Russians
signed the Bushehr Protocol with Iran, thus agreeing to aid in the
building of the Iranian civilian nuclear program. Later in the same
year the US secured an agreement with Yeltsin to abandon the element
of the deal with Iran, which was to see the Russians build a centrifugal
enrichment plant, originally guaranteed in the Bushehr Protocol.
It was wisely thought that the construction of an enrichment facility
would rapidly advance the military nuclear ambitions of Iran. It
is now becoming apparent that Iran has sidestepped this problem.
While there still remains a certain
competition for influence in Afghanistan between Pakistan and Iran
today, most would concede that relations have warmed, since the
recent intervention of the US in Afghanistan. Indeed Iran's foreign
Minister, Kamal Kharazai announced in 2001 that "Differences
[between Iran and Pakistan] are now over." Whilst perhaps a
little exaggerated, the claim is indicative of growing ties between
the two, ties perhaps allowing a certain renewed freedom to Dr Khan's
earlier ambitions of Iran-Pakistani nuclear cooperation. While nuclear
cooperation between Pakistan and Iran is highly unlikely to be given
any official endorsement, it remains a possibility that Pakistan
has loosened the US-imposed leash on (a now freelance) Dr Khan.
With the announcement by the IAEA
of their suspicions that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapons
program through the development of a uranium enrichment facility,
the spotlight must fall again on Dr Khan as a likely candidate for
the provision of the necessary expertise. Here we have a brilliant
scientist with expertise in uranium enrichment, a shadowy history,
which includes offering aid to anti-Western regimes and a history
of cooperation with the Iranians. The strong possibility that Dr
Khan has renewed his ties with the Iranians and aided the nuclear
ambitions of yet another anti-western government should perhaps
now be taken seriously.