PERSBERICHT
Bij aanstaande Hiroshima- en Nagasaki-
herdenkingen, ook aandacht voor de Nederlandse rol bij de Pakistaanse Atoombom.
Met name in Japan wil men in augustus tijdens
de herdenking van de slachtoffers van de atoombommen op Hiroshima en Nagasaki
aandacht schenken aan de Nederlandse betrokkenheid bij de totstandkoming van de
Pakistaanse Atoombom en de verdere verspreiding van nucleaire kennis.
Volgens informatie van Ultracentrifuge-klokkenluider
Frits Veerman zal vanaf 6 mei a.s. een Japanse TV- ploeg enkele maanden in Nederland
verblijven om het politieke schandaal in beeld te brengen. In
een uitzending van het radioprogramma Argos op 29 april 2005 wordt de dubieuze
rol die de Nederlandse overheid, met name de ministeries, inlichtingendienst BVD/
AIVD en de rechterlijke macht speelt met nieuwe gegevens uit geheime rapporten
toegelicht. Het programma is nog te
beluisteren op de website van de VPRO-radio (www.vpro.nl) De
cameraploeg in actie De uitzending
vind plaats op 8 augustus op de Japanse TV meer
foto's Hiroshima
60 years later
[NHK World TV](In English)
Aug.7,Sun. 3:10 - 3:35(JST) On
the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombing, the city of Hiroshima sends out a
message to the world for the abolition of all nuclear weapons. NHK World's Lorne
Saxberg brings you reports from Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Peace Memorial
Museum, as well as the highlights of the August 6th memorial ceremony.
For
the details, please check the "e-GUIDE". |
NHK
JAPAN BROADCASTING
" AQ KHAN NETWORK"
INTERVIEW WITH RUED LUBBERS
CORRESPONDENT:
(NOT IDENTIFIED)
PRODUCER: HATAE
TAPE #1 & #2
(OFF-MIC CONVERSATION)
QUESTION:
Thank
y ou for joining us in-- on our interview. Y ou know-- as y ou understand, y ou
know, we're here from Hiroshima making a documentary on the 60th anniversary.
And I'm very much looking at the-- 60-- well, history of nuclear proliferation--
especially with the focus on the Khan case. And-- well, first of all, I'd like
to start off with-- y ou know-- talking a bit about Urenco (PH)
and-- y ou
know-- I'm told it was created in 1970. And I'm just wondering, y ou know, you--
around that period, y ou were the economic affairs minister. And I was just wondering
what the political economic situation was in Holland that called for the creation
of-- uranium enrichment plant in Holland.
RUED LUBBERS:
Let me--
start by explaining to y ou that the nuclear technology enrichment of uranium--
was developed in the Netherlands, specifically in the Netherlands-- much before
1970. But at some point, it has to be a commercial venture. And then we decided
to partner-- with-- Germany and the UK. And that is what Urenco
then became.
So when I became a minister in 1973 for economic affairs.
In my portfolio was
this industrial activity based on the knowledge as developed in the Netherlands
for enriching uranium. So that is the Urenco story in short. In my memory, this
was not my decision, it was done before. But it had matured to a-- an enterprise,
Urenco. So it was still at the very beginning, but it was
developing with the
three country.
This was, of course, protected because it was-- sensitive--
technology. I wouldn't say only in relation to the proliferation risks, but also
just because it was confidential because it was intellectual property. For that
reason. So when I was a-- a (UNINTEL) minister, this is the history. It's good
for y ou, especially for the Japanese people to be aware that in the European
Union much
earlier, one had seen the creation of (UNINTEL) .This is a-- what
we call a European community which was established af ter the second world war.
But now we are talking the-- the '50s, '20 years earlier on the basis that the
use of-- nuclear technology forweapons was one thing, this was for France and
the UK.
But next to that, there was a need in Europe to develop for peace purposes
nuclear-- technology.
And that was the idea, part of that was Urenco. And we
had a-- already those days a reactor center for the same purposes in a small village
called Patencho (PH) .This is a bit of background, where are we in 1973. Yes,
we start to produce enriched uranium. And-- I was the responsible minister and
I was informed sh'ortly when I was in office .
I don't know exactly the day,
but not that long that-- one has come to the conclusions that one of the trainees
was very young gentlemen who had done study in Delft Technical University. He
was allowed to work there. Probably-- transgressed the rules and took some material
home and maybe was copying that and so on, so there came an investigation in this
young Pakistani gentlemen
(UNINTEL) .
QUESTION:
This was at the
time y ou were the minister?
RUED LUBBERS: Yes, I was the minister.
I remember those meetings, we were concerned. An~--came of course an instruction
to the intelligence services in the Netherlands to have a very close look into
that. The next (UNINTEL) not long af ter that that
they reported to me. We
had a meeting with the civil servants informing me as
TAPE #1
& #2 PG.13 /14
No, no. To be very honest, no. Not at all I think.
I cannot remember that I had-- and I had many conversations, of course, as prime
minister on very important topics. Never. I think that never came to that level,
no.
QUESTION:
As y ou said, y ou know, now is 2005 and-- y ou know--
now y ou can say many things. And do you-- looking back, do y ou regret-- m--
maybe those decision about Kahn in the '70s and 180s or-- how do y ou think--
RUED
LUBBERS:
No, I don't regret them. I see this is part of history, learning
lessons. Of course something went wrong. But to say to regret it's not totally--
I (UNINTEL) about priorities. I think if y ou go to a-- American President or
if y ou see the Secretary of State, which we sit many-- many times I was-- twice
sharing the European Union as the president, y ou have a whole agenda. Even now
when I think back, I cannot imagine what I said that I should have put on the
agenda Kahn because there was something cooking which could become a problem at
a certain moment. No. I think-- and in all honesty, those daysI thought in the
dimension of building nuclear capacity in Pakistan, not capacity in a nUffiber
of countries. What we know by now, that came much later.
QUESTION:
So
in those days, y ou couldn't imagine Pakistan being a nuclear state?
RUED
LUBBERS:
I could imagine it. Pakistan was (UNINTEL) but I could not imagine
that Kahn was already on his next phase. He was not only building the capacity
in Pakistan, but he was offering-- his possibilities to other states. That became
a proliferation thing. It was not only the Pakistan thing.
QUESTION:
Okay--
y ou might have seen this person on-- on the news or something, but-- y ou know--
we spoke to an ex-colleague of Mr. Kahn--
(OFF-MIC CONVERSATION)
QUESTION:
Mr.
Kahn called Fritz Vim (PH), I think he's well-known in Holland. And I mean, he
was telling us, like, y ou know-- he gave a lot of information to (UNINTEL) about--
y ou know-- getting letters--
RUED LUBBERS:
(UNINTEL PHRASE)
QUESTION:
Yeah, and he got letters from Kahn and stuff. And he told us that-- y ou know--
that (UNINTEL) was telling him not to-- keep it-- well-- he told us, y ou know--
RUED
LUBBERS:
(UNINTEL)
QUESTION:
Well shut his mouth, y ou know?
RUED
LUBBERS: Sure, yeah, keep your mouth shut.
QUESTION: And can you--
do-- do you-- can y ou understand this? Do y ou think this could be true, or--
I mean--
RUED LUBBERS: I think that could be true. I think it could
be true. I don1t know if it is true, but could it be true? Yes. I think this was
part of this culture, give us all the information, don't talk to us and welll
follow up. So and during the cold war, at times, there was a strong habit in this
following information (UNINTEL) a lot of-- the-- it was not about the effectiveness
in the end, it was to be informed.
And it was really the culture and the routine.
And I said earlier there was, of course, no platform of U.N. or Vienna or so to
do this. So there's the
superpower itself. This didn't stop at the end of the
cold war. And there is a
bit of my worry. Because if you-- if y ou allow me
to give another example, we know by now that
TAPE #1 & #2
PG.14 /14
Osama Bin Laden was followed for a long time by the services
in Washington. It was not that it was not known. I mean, it was not a very unpleasant
surprise what happened to (UNINTEL) the twin towers in New York. I mean, it--
there was Osama already seven years before, they followed him precisely. And it
is intriguing to see how could they stop then Osama Bin Laden when they Knew where
he was, what he was doing. And there was information all the time. But there--
They
didn't find a way to block it. They didn't mean that the services didn't
function.
They functioned and functioned. And they reported.
But it-- it was not translated
in an effective action. And that is a lesson to
be learned that, in general,
one waits too long. And there we are back then,
how to be more effective. And
I am biased to the U.N. and Vienna and--
(UNINTEL) them that they can do their
job in an effective way and-- and building on that.
And not to have this endless
discussion about-- the risks and the volatile
negotiations and the pressure
of the United States and a few other countries on what is in Iran, but now it's
North Korea. I think that this is still the
fundamental point- that you have
to make a shift change, which was not possible in the cold war, yes, which we
are discussing which is possible today.
QUESTION:
Now the lay-- really
layman's question but, you know, going back to that Fritz-- Fritz Vim (UNINTEL)
you know-- keeping it quiet. Can you tell us, you know, why you have to keep this
so covered up, you know, very secret? Can you tell us why?
RUED LUBBERS:
Yeah,
that's very clear to me why-- why-- at the moment-- that you go for a system of
secret services, because you think you will be more effective to get a grip on
what's really happening, a central point is the secrecy, is the secrecy.
So
that is the choice. Not to go in public, to do it-- in secrecy.
I can assure
you, this is not only on the nuclear thing-- I'm absolutely sure
that there
are more-- criminality in the world, if you like, which is followed-- terrorists
these days, which are very much followed by services where if you or I would go
to them with information, they would say to me, hush, hush, leave it.
I don't
know, you have to check in Japan how the services there work. So this is not exceptional.
This is normal. The relevant question, of course, is how then does democracy functiQn?
And is it effective? And-- the-- the question of effectiveness we discussed sufficiently.
We can see it was all together not that effective. We'd better become effective
as of today. And that's not to have more secret services and information and all
that. That's not the real point, it's the action point what to do.
QUESTION:
Some
would say, you know, some reports say that-- you know-- the gov-- it would be
a big scandal-- embar-- embarrassment for the Dutch Government if this came out.
Was there that kind of element?
RUED LUBBERS:
No, I never saw it
as an embarrassment. And I decided those days to live up to my obligations not
to (UNINTEL PHRASE) the Japanese TV was not sitting here in the Netherlands 20
years ago. But then gradually you say this is history, this can be told. So I
think what you ask me now is not any longer reason to be discrete. I have not
studied all the files and the details. But the broad lines are clear, and I think
they are Washington also clear. You can--
(BREAK IN TAPE)
***END
OF TRANSCRIPT***
|
|
Dit is een origineel persbericht. CIA
weerhield Nederlandse regering tweemaal van ingrijpen in zaak-Khan Ruud
Lubbers over rol van de Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst in atoomschandaal
Ex-premier
Lubbers geeft in een openhartig interview toe dat de Nederlandse regering in 1975
en 1986 de Pakistaanse atoomgeleerde en spion Abdul Khan heeft laten lopen op
instigatie van de CIA. 'De Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst gaf er de voorkeur aan
om de
man niet vast te zetten maar te volgen.' Lubbers zegt dat vandaag in
het VPRO-programma Argos op Radio 1. Khan en de door hem in Nederland gestolen
atoomgeheimen hebben aan de wieg gestaan van de Pakistaanse atoombom. Bovendien
heeft Khan vorig jaar publiekelijk toegegeven deze informatie te hebben doorverkocht
aan Libië, Noord-Korea en Iran.
Ruud Lubbers
kreeg in 1975 als minister van Economische Zaken informatie over wat eerst leek
op industriële spionage. De Pakistaanse ingenieur Abdul Khan was gedetacheerd
bij het Almelose bedrijf Urenco en werd ervan verdacht geheime informatie over
uraniumverrijking mee naar huis te nemen en daar te kopiëren. Na overleg
met de BVD werd volstaan met de maatregel Khan over te plaatsen en hem de toegang
tot het
Urenco-complex te ontzeggen. Ook de Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst
CIA werd ingelicht.
Ondanks dat er serieuze verdenking bestond, werd Khan niet
strafrechtelijk vervolgd. De CIA had daarom verzocht, vertelt Lubbers nu: 'De
Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst gaf er de voorkeur aan om de man niet vast te zetten
maar te volgen. De Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst heeft hier gepraktiseerd: geef
ons alle informatie, maar zet die man niet vast. Laat hem maar gaan, wij volgen
hem en dan krijgen we meer informatie.'
Blijkbaar ontging het Khan zelf niet
dat hij door de mand was gevallen, want eind 1975 keerde hij niet meer terug van
een vakantie in Pakistan. In maart 1979 meldde
de Duitse televisie dat Pakistan toegang had tot de
Urenco-technologie via
Abdul Kahn. Nederland sloeg internationaal een modderfiguur. De Nederlandse justitie
begon een onderzoek en dat leidde er toe dat Khan, die in Pakistan zat, in 1983
bij verstek werd veroordeeld tot vier jaar gevangenisstraf. Een vonnis dat in
1985 in hoger beroep werd vernietigd wegens een vormfout. Toch waren er nog juridische
mogelijkheden
om de strafzaak over te doen. Lubbers, die inmiddels premier was, zegt daarover
dat hij daar toen voorstander van was. Maar het gebeurde niet, want de inlichtingendiensten
waren er niet voor. Lubbers was daar niet blij mee, vertelt hij: 'Ik zeg: wat
zijn we nou aan het doen? We volgen die man al tien jaar. Kennelijk is hij serieus
bezig. En dan hoor ik weer: nee, laat dat maar aan de diensten over. Die zijn
effectiever en dat moeten wij ook niet als Nederland willen.' In
de overwegingen waarom hij als premier van Nederland, ondanks zijn twijfels, toch
akkoord ging, speelde volgens Lubbers de Koude Oorlog een grote rol: 'We zaten
toen ook nog volop in de Koude Oorlog - midden tachtiger jaren, we zijn bezig
met het plaatsen van middellange afstandswapens en zo. Dit was voor mij ook toen:
het laatste woord is niet Den Haag, maar Washington. Er is geen twijfel over dat
die alles wisten en alles hoorden. De afweging wat de beste koers is, zag ik niet
als iets wat de Nederlandse premier moest doen.' In juni 1986 ontving de advocaat
van Khan een brief dat het Openbaar Ministerie afzag van verdere vervolging.
Lubbers
vindt, terugkijkend, dat het eigenlijk niet kan dat Khan onder de neus van de
geheime diensten kon doorwerken aan de Pakistaanse atoombom. Er naar gevraagd
sluit hij niet helemaal uit dat er dubbele agenda's waren, met het oog op de kille
verhoudingen tussen oost en west. India, dat door de VS werd beschouwd als een
bondgenoot van de
Sovjet Unie, beschikte immers al langer over een atoombom. |
