On September
the 11th, 2001, America and the world witnessed a new kind of war. We saw the
great harm that a stateless network could inflict upon our country, killers armed
with box cutters, mace, and 19 airline tickets. Those attacks also raised the
prospect of even worse dangers -- of other weapons in the hands of other men.
The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden
attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.
In
the past, enemies of America required massed armies, and great navies, powerful
air forces to put our nation, our people, our friends and allies at risk. In the
Cold War, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but
believed that deterrents made those weapons a last resort. What has changed in
the 21st century is that, in the hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction
would be a first resort -- the preferred means to further their ideology of suicide
and random murder. These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build,
hide, and transport. Armed with a single vial of a biological agent or a single
nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics, or failing states, could gain the power
to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace.
America,
and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come. We
must confront the danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose. I have made clear
to all the policy of this nation: America will not permit terrorists and dangerous
regimes to threaten us with the world's most deadly weapons. (Applause.)
Meeting this duty has required changes in thinking and strategy. Doctrines designed
to contain empires, deter aggressive states, and defeat massed armies cannot fully
protect us from this new threat. America faces the possibility of catastrophic
attack from ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. So that
is why we are developing and deploying missile defenses to guard our people. The
best intelligence is necessary to win the war on terror and to stop proliferation.
So that is why I have established a commission that will examine our intelligence
capabilities and recommend ways to improve and adapt them to detect new and emerging
threats.
We're determined to confront
those threats at the source. We will stop these weapons from being acquired or
built. We'll block them from being transferred. We'll prevent them from ever being
used. One source of these weapons is dangerous and secretive regimes that build
weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and force their influence
upon the world. These nations pose different challenges; they require different
strategies.
The former dictator of
Iraq possessed and used weapons of mass destruction against his own people. For
12 years, he defied the will of the international community. He refused to disarm
or account for his illegal weapons and programs. He doubted our resolve to enforce
our word -- and now he sits in a prison cell, while his country moves toward a
democratic future. (Applause.)
To
Iraq's east, the government of Iran is unwilling to abandon a uranium enrichment
program capable of producing material for nuclear weapons. The United States is
working with our allies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that
Iran meets its commitments and does not develop nuclear weapons. (Applause.)
In
the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-range ballistic
missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons, and now threatens to build
more. Together with our partners in Asia, America is insisting that North Korea
completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.
America
has consistently brought these threats to the attention of international organizations.
We're using every means of diplomacy to answer them. As for my part, I will continue
to speak clearly on these threats. I will continue to call upon the world to confront
these dangers, and to end them. (Applause.)
In
recent years, another path of proliferation has become clear, as well. America
and other nations are learning more about black-market operatives who deal in
equipment and expertise related to weapons of mass destruction. These dealers
are motivated by greed, or fanaticism, or both. They find eager customers in outlaw
regimes, which pay millions for the parts and plans they need to speed up their
weapons programs. And with deadly technology and expertise going on the market,
there's the terrible possibility that terrorists groups could obtain the ultimate
weapons they desire most.
The
extent and sophistication of such networks can be seen in the case of a man named
Abdul Qadeer Khan. This is the story as we know it so far.
A.
Q. Khan is known throughout the world as the father of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program. What was not publicly known, until recently, is that he also
led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology
and know-how.
For decades, Mr.
Khan remained on the Pakistani government payroll, earning a modest salary.
Yet, he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through the sale of nuclear
technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa to the
Korean Peninsula.
A. Q. Khan,
himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as director of the network,
its leading scientific mind, as well as its primary salesman. Over the past decade,
he made frequent trips to consult with his clients and to sell his expertise.
He and his associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium, as
well as a nuclear design stolen from the Pakistani government. The network sold
uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can transform into enriched
uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and
North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs
for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries
with components, and in some cases, with complete centrifuges.
To
increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a factory in Malaysia
to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts were purchased
through network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. These
procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies as a shortcut to personal
wealth, and they set up front companies to deceive legitimate firms into selling
them tightly controlled materials.
Khan's
deputy -- a man named B.S.A. Tahir -- ran SMB computers, a business in Dubai.
Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferation activities of
the A. Q. Khan network. Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial
officer and money launderer. He was also its shipping agent, using his computer
firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed
the Malaysia facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs, and then
ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai. Tahir also arranged for
parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for
shipment to other customers.
This
picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several years by American
and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence services gradually uncovered
this network's reach, and identified its key experts and agents and money men.
Operatives followed its transactions, mapped the extent of its operations. They
monitored the travel of A. Q. Khan and senior associates. They shadowed
members of the network around the world, they recorded their conversations, they
penetrated their operations, we've uncovered their secrets. This work involved
high risk, and all Americans can be grateful for the hard work and the dedication
of our fine intelligence professionals. (Applause.)
Governments
around the world worked closely with us to unravel the Khan network, and
to put an end to his criminal enterprise. A. Q. Khan has confessed his crimes,
and his top associates are out of business. The government of Pakistan is interrogating
the network's members, learning critical details that will help them prevent it
from ever operating again. President Musharraf has promised to share all the information
he learns about the Khan network, and has assured us that his country will never
again be a source of proliferation.
Mr.
Tahir is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his activities. Malaysian
authorities have assured us that the factory the network used is no longer producing
centrifuge parts. Other members of the network remain at large. One by one, they
will be found, and their careers in the weapons trade will be ended.
As
a result of our penetration of the network, American and the British intelligence
identified a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts manufactured at the Malaysia
facility. We followed the shipment of these parts to Dubai, and watched as they
were transferred to the BBC China, a German-owned ship. After the ship passed
through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, it was stopped by German and Italian
authorities. They found several containers, each forty feet in length, listed
on the ship's manifest as full of "used machine parts." In fact, these
containers were filled with parts of sophisticated centrifuges.
The
interception of the BBC China came as Libyan and British and American officials
were discussing the possibility of Libya ending its WMD programs. The United States
and Britain confronted Libyan officials with this evidence of an active and illegal
nuclear program. About two months ago, Libya's leader voluntarily agreed to end
his nuclear and chemical weapons programs, not to pursue biological weapons, and
to permit thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We're now working in partnership
with these organizations and with the United Kingdom to help the government of
Libya dismantle those programs and eliminate all dangerous materials.
Colonel
Ghadafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer once his commitment
is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example. Abandoning the pursuit
of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with the United States, and other
free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will not bring security or international
prestige, but only political isolation, economic hardship, and other unwelcome
consequences. (Applause.)
We know
that Libya was not the only customer of the Khan network. Other countries expressed
great interest in their services. These regimes and other proliferators like Khan
should know: We and our friends are determined to protect our people and the world
from proliferation. (Applause.)
Breaking
this network is one major success in a broad-based effort to stop the spread of
terrible weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to the threats of a new era.
America and the nations of Australia, France and Germany, Italy and Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have launched the
Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict lethal materials in transit. Our
nations are sharing intelligence information, tracking suspect international cargo,
conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared to search planes and ships,
to seize weapons and missiles and equipment that raise proliferation concerns,
just as we did in stopping the dangerous cargo on the BBC China before it reached
Libya. Three more governments -- Canada and Singapore and Norway -- will be participating
in this initiative. We'll continue to expand the core group of PSI countries.
And as PSI grows, proliferators will find it harder than ever to trade in illicit
weapons.
