From
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Abdul
Qadeer Khan (born 1935) is a Pakistani engineer widely regarded as
the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. (His middle name is also occasionally
rendered as Quadeer, Qadir or Gadeer and his given names are often abbreviated
to AQ). In January 2004, he confessed to having been involved in an international
network of clandestine nuclear proliferation from Pakistan to Libya, Iran and
North Korea. On February 5, 2004, president Pervez Musharraf announced that he
had pardoned Khan. On February 16, The Times of India reported that Khan had suffered
a heart.
Early
career
Born in 1935 into a middle-class
Muslim family in Bhopal, India, Khan migrated to Pakistan in 1952 following the
country's partition from India five years earlier. He trained as an engineer at
the University of Karachi before moving after graduation to West Germany and Belgium
for further studies, earning a doctorate from the Catholic University of Leuven
in Belgium in 1972. That same year, he joined the staff of the Physical Dynamics
Research Laboratory, or FDO, in Amsterdam. FDO was a subcontractor for the URENCO
uranium enrichment plant at Almelo in the Netherlands, which had been established
in 1970 by the United Kingdom, West Germany and the Netherlands to assure a supply
of enriched uranium for European nuclear reactors. The URENCO plant used highly
classified centrifuge technology to separate fissionable uranium-235 from U-238
by spinning the a mixture of the two isotopes at up to 100,000 revolutions a minute.
The technical complexity of this system is the main obstacle to would-be nuclear
powers developing their own enrichment facilities. In May 1974, India tested a
nuclear bomb, to the great alarm of Pakistan's government. Around this time, Khan
had privileged access to the most secret areas of the URENCO plant as well as
to documentation on centrifuge technology. A subsequent investigation by the Dutch
authorities found that he had passed highly classified material to a network of
Pakistani intelligence agents, although they found no evidence that he was sent
to the Netherlands as a spy, nor were they able to determine whether he approached
his government or whether it was the other way around. He left the Netherlands
suddenly in January 1976 and was put in charge of the Pakistani nuclear programme
with the support of then prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Development
of nuclear weapons
Khan established the Engineering Research Laboratories
at Kahuta in July 1976, subsequently renamed as the Dr. A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories
(KRL), as the focal point for developing a uranium enrichment capability. KRL
also took on many other weapons projects, including the development of the nuclear-capable
Ghauri ballistic missiles. KRL occupied a unique role in Pakistani industry, reporting
directly to the Prime Minister's office, and having extremely close relations
with the military: former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has said that during her
term of office, even she was not allowed to visit the facility. Pakistan
very rapidly established its own uranium enrichment capability and was reportedly
able to produce highly enriched uranium by 1986. This progress was so rapid that
international suspicion was raised as to whether it had had outside assistance.
It was reported that Chinese technicians had been at the facility in the early
1980s, but suspicions soon fell on Khan's activities at URENCO. In 1983, he was
sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by an Amsterdam court for attempted
espionage, although the sentence was later overturned on appeal on a legal technicality.
Khan rejected any suggestion that Pakistan had illicitly acquired nuclear expertise:
"All the research work [at Kahuta] was the result of our innovation and struggle,"
he told a group of Pakistani librarians in 1990. "We did not receive any
technical know-how from abroad, but we can't reject the use of books, magazines
and research papers in this connection." In
1987, a British newspaper reported that Khan had openly confirmed Pakistan's acquisition
of a nuclear capability. He was quoted as confirming that American intelligence
reports "about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is speculation of
some foreign newspapers" and criticised Pakistan's detractors, who had "told
the U.S. that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they now know we have
done it." Khan's statement was subsequently disavowed by the Pakistani government
and Khan himself initially denied giving it, although he later retracted his denial.
The Pakistani newspaper The Dawn reported in October 1991 that Khan repeated his
claim at a dinner meeting of businessmen and industrialists in Karachi, which
"sent a wave of jubilation" through the audience. During
the 1980s and 1990s, Western governments became increasingly convinced that covert
nuclear and ballistic missile collaboration was taking place between China, Pakistan
and North Korea. According to the Washington Post, "U.S. intelligence operatives
secretly rifled [Khan's] luggage ... during an overseas trip in the early 1980s
to find the first concrete evidence of Chinese collaboration with Pakistan's bomb
effort: a drawing of a crude, but highly reliable, Hiroshima-sized weapon that
must have come directly from Beijing, according to U.S. officials." The activities
of the Khan Research Laboratories led to the United States terminating economic
and military aid to Pakistan in October 1990, following which the Pakistani government
agreed to a freeze in the nuclear programme. According to the Federation of American
Scientists, this came into force in 1991. However, Khan later claimed in a July
1996 interview with the weekly Friday Times that "at no stage was the programme
(of producing weapons-grade enriched uranium) ever stopped" [1]. The
American clampdown may have prompted an increasing reliance on Chinese and North
Korean nuclear and missile expertise. In 1995, the U.S. learned that the Khan
Research Laboratories had bought 5,000 specialized magnets from a Chinese government-owned
company, for use in uranium enrichment equipment. More worryingly, it was reported
that Pakistani nuclear technology was being exported to other aspirant nuclear
states, notably North Korea. In May 1998, Newsweek magazine published an article
alleging that Khan had offered to sell nuclear know-how to Iraq, an allegation
that he denied. A few weeks later, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests
that finally confirmed both countries' development of atomic weapons. The event
was greeted with jubilation in both countries and Khan was feted as a national
hero. President Rafiq Tarrar awarded him a gold medal for his role in masterminding
the Pakistani nuclear programme. The United States immediately imposed sanctions
on both India and Pakistan and publicly blamed China for assisting the Pakistanis.
Investigations into nuclear proliferation
Khan's open promotion of Pakistan's
nuclear and missile capabilities became something of an embarrassment to Pakistan's
government. The United States government became increasingly convinced that Pakistan
was trading nuclear technology to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missile
technology. In the face of strong American criticism, the Pakistani government
announced in March 2001 that Khan was to be dismissed from his post as chairman
of KRL, a move that drew strong criticism from the religious and nationalist opposition
to President Pervez Musharraf. Perhaps in response to this, the government instead
appointed Khan to the post of special science and technology adviser to President
Musharraf, with ministerial rank. While this could be presented as a promotion
for Khan, it removed him from hands-on management of KRL and gave the government
an opportunity to keep a closer eye on his activities.
Khan
came under renewed scrutiny following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan to oust the fundamentalist Taliban
regime. It emerged that al-Qaeda had made repeated efforts to obtain nuclear materials
to build either a radiological bomb or a crude nuclear bomb. In late October 2001,
the Pakistani government arrested three Pakistani nuclear scientists, all with
close ties to Khan, for their suspected connections with the Taliban. Two of the
scientists were subsequently said to have admitted having had talks with Osama
bin Laden.
The Bush administration continued
to investigate Pakistani nuclear proliferation, ratcheting up the pressure on
the Pakistani government in 2001 and 2002 and focusing on Khan's personal role.
In 2002, the Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed "senior Pakistani officials"
as conceding that Khan's dismissal from KRL had been prompted by U.S. suspicions
of his involvement in weapons technology transfers with North Korea. It was alleged
in December 2002 that U.N. intelligence officials had found evidence that an unidentified
agent supposedly acting on Khan's behalf had offered nuclear expertise to Iraq
in mid-1990, though Khan strongly denied this allegation and the Pakistani government
declared the evidence "fraudulent". The United States responded by imposing
sanctions on KRL, citing concerns about missile technology transfers.
Khan
and the Iranian nuclear programme
In August 2003, reports emerged of dealings
with Iran; it was claimed that Khan had offered to sell nuclear technology as
long ago as 1989. The Iranian government came under intense pressure from the
United States and European Union to make a full disclosure of its nuclear programme
and finally agreed in October 2003 to accept tougher investigations from the International
Atomic Energy Authority. The IAEA reported that Iran had established a large uranium
enrichment facility using centrifuges based on the stolen URENCO designs, which
had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1987." The intermediary
was not named but many diplomats and analysts pointed to Pakistan and specifically
to Khan, who was said to have visited Iran in 1986. The Iranians turned over the
names of their suppliers and international inspectors quickly identified the Iranian
centrifuges as Pak-1s, the model developed by Khan in the early 1980s. Two senior
staff at the Khan Research Laboratories were subsequently arrested in December
2003 on suspicion of having sold nuclear technology to the Iranians. That same
month, on December 19, Libya made a surprise announcement that it had weapons
of mass destruction programmes which it would now abandon. Libyan government officials
were quoted as saying that Libya had bought nuclear components from various black
market dealers, including Pakistani scientists. In particular, American officials
who visited the Libyan uranium plants shortly afterwards reported that the centrifuges
used there were very similar to the Iranian ones. The Pakistani government's blanket
denials became untenable as evidence mounted of illicit technology transfers.
It opened an investigation into Khan's activities, arguing that even if there
had been wrongdoing, it had occurred without government knowledge or approval.
Although he was not arrested, Khan was summoned for "debriefing". On
January 25, 2004 the investigators reported that Khan and Mohammed Farooq, a high-ranking
manager at KRL, had provided unauthorised technical assistance - allegedly in
exchange for tens of millions of dollars - to Iran's nuclear-weapons program in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. General Mirza Aslam Beg, a former chief of army
staff at the time, was also said to have been implicated; the Wall Street Journal
quoted government officials as saying that Khan had told investigators that nuclear
technology transfers to Iran had been authorised by General Beg. On January 31,
Khan was sacked from his post as the presidential science adviser, ostensibly
to "allow a fair investigation" of the nuclear proliferation scandal.
It remains to be seen whether Khan, Farooq and Beg
will face any charges. Khan remains an extremely popular figure in Pakistan. He
is known as an outspoken nationalist and for his belief that the West is inherently
hostile to Islam; in Pakistan's strongly anti-American climate, tough action against
him poses political risks for President Musharraf, who already faces accusations
of being too pro-American. An additional complicating factor is that few believe
that Khan acted alone and the affair risks gravely damaging the Pakistani army,
which controlled the nuclear programme and of which Musharraf is still the commander-in-chief.
The same investigation also exposed South African businessman Asher Karni as having
sold nuclear devices to Khan's associates. Karni is currently in US prison, awaiting
trial.
U.S. reaction to the pardon
The United States government decided to leave the fate of Kahn in the hands of
president Musharraf, imposing no penalties on the Pakistani government or on individuals.
Officials explained that in the War on Terrorism it was not their goal to denounce
or imprison people, but "to get results." The White House chose not
to sanction Pakistan or to demand an independent investigation of the Pakistani
military. "It's just another case where you catch more flies with honey than
with vinegar," an official explained.
References and links
"Pakistan's nuclear
father, master spy", MSNBC, October 24, 2003
"Kahuta - Pakistan
Special Weapons Facilities", Federation of American Scientists
"A
Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network"
"U.S.
Aides See Troubling Trend In China-Pakistan Nuclear Ties; Program's History Could
Be Factor as Sanctions Are Weighed", Washington Post, April 1, 1996
"Scientist's remarks raise doubts on Pakistan's n-plan", The Hindu,
Madras, July 27, 1996
"North Korea Got A Little Help From Neighbors
--- Secret Nuclear Program Tapped Russian Suppliers And Pakistani Know-How",
Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2002
"Iraq may have had offer from
Pakistani", Associated Press, December 22, 2002
"Inquiry Suggests
Pakistanis Sold Nuclear Secrets", New York Times, December 22, 2003
"Pakistan Might Charge Creator Of Nuclear Bomb; Prosecutors Say Scientists
Sold Nuclear Secrets to Iran And Others in Late 1980s", Wall Street Journal,
January 26, 2004
"Pakistan's nuclear hero, world's No. 1 nuclear suspect
; Revered as the father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer
Khan has confessed to sharing weapons secrets with regimes around the world",
Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 2004
profiel kahn
Prof. Abdul Qadeer Khan
After
receiving his early education in Bhopal, Dr Abdul Quadeer Khan obtained the degree
of Bachelor of Science in 1960 from the University of Karachi. He went on to study
in Berlin , West Germany and achieved high competence through attending several
courses in metallurgical engineering. He obtained the degree of Master of Science
(Technology ) in 1967 from Delft Technological University of Leuven, Belgium.
In 1976, he joined the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) in Pakistan and
set up an uranium enrichment industrial plant. As a tribute to his services to
Pakistan , during May 1981 , the then president of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq
renamed the Engineering Research Laboratories, Kahuta, as, Dr Abdul Quadeer Khan
Research Laboratories (KRL).
The scientific contributions
of Dr Khan have been recognized in several ways. As an active scientist and technologist,
he has published more than 188 scientific research papers in international journals
of high repute. He has been editor of a large number of books on metallurgy, advanced
materials and phase transformation. His academic and scholastic activities have
attracted the attention of number of western countries where he has delivered
more than 100 lectures. His work on Industrial Uranium Enrichment Plant for peaceful
application of nuclear technology has resulted in a breakthrough in the field
of metallurgy and materials science. It is entirely due to his efforts that the
process of enrichment of Uranium was successfully completed in Pakistan . This
breakthrough ultimately resulted in the historic explosion of six nuclear bombs
in May 1998 . Not only this but a significant development was also made with the
successful test firing of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, Ghauri 1 , in
April 1998 and Ghauri II in April 1999. Dr Khan has received honorary degrees
of Doctor of Science from the University of Karachi in 1993, Doctor of Science
from Baqai Medical University on (1998), Doctor of Science from Hamdard University,
Karachi (1999) and Doctor of Science from the University of Engineering and Technology,
Lahore in December 2000. For his contributions in the field of science and technology,
the President of Pakistan conferred upon Dr Khan the award of Nishan-I-Imtiaz
1996 and 1998. Dr Khan is the only Pakistani to have received the highest civil
award of “Nishan-I-Imtiaz’’ twice. He is also a recipient of Hilal-I-Imtiaz.
Dr Khan is a Fellow of Kazakh National Academy of
Sciences, the first Asian scientist with this honour, elected Fellow of the Islamic
Academy of Sciences and Honorary Member of the Korean Academy of Science and Technology.
He was elected unopposed to the post of President of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences
in 1997-a position that he still occupies. He is a member of many national and
international professional organizations including the Pakistan Institute of Metallurgical
Engineers; Pakistan Institute of Engineers; and Institute of Central and West
Asian Studies.He is a Member of the Institute of Materials, London; American Society
of Metals (ASM); Canadian Institute of Metals (CIM) and Japan Institute of Metals
(JIM). Prof. A Q Khan sits on the Boards of Governors of numerous universities
and institutes. He is a Member of the Executive Committee, GIK Institute of Engineering
and Technology; Member, Board of Governors, Hamdard University; Member, Board
of Governors, Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology; Member Syndicate,
Quaidi-I-Azam university, Islamabad ; and Member, Board of Governors, International
Islamic University, Islamabad.
Prof.
Abdul Quadeer Khan Chairman, Dr. Reserch, Laboratories,P.O.Box 502, Rawalpindi,
Pakistan.
